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Gender and beauty in the financial analyst profession: 









We examine how gender and beauty affect the likelihood of being voted as an All-Star in the 
financial analyst profession in both the United States and China. We find that female analysts are 
more likely to be voted as All-Star analysts in the United States, but good-looking female U.S. 
analysts are less likely to be voted as All-Stars. The conclusion is the opposite for Chinese 
analysts. We find that female analysts in China are less likely to be voted as All-Stars, but the 
likelihood increases with their facial attractiveness. These findings implicate a beauty penalty for 
female analysts in the United States and gender discrimination against female analysts in China. 
This career path evidence from a competitive financial industry suggests that gender and beauty 
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This study investigates gender discrimination and beauty bias in the financial industry in 
the United States and China. Specifically, we examine whether the likelihood of becoming a star 
analyst, one of the most important career outcomes for financial analysts, is affected by analysts’ 
gender and beauty. These two countries have very different legal policies and cultures. After the 
passage of the federal civil rights legislation of the 1960s in the United States, overt forms of 
discrimination, such as stating that a particular gender or type of appearance is preferred in job 
postings, are illegal. In China, however, these forms of discrimination and biases are common. 
Kuhn and Shen (2013) find that over one-third of Chinese companies, seeking highly educated 
urban employees, have at least one Internet job posting stating a preferred gender. In addition, 
many Chinese government departments and private companies make explicit requests for age, 
height, and beauty in their Internet job postings (Human Rights Watch 2018).1 Such cultural and 
legislative differences call into question whether the gender and beauty biases in the labor market 
differ in the United States and China.  
The issue as to whether gender discrimination exists in the labor market remains debated 
among academics and policymakers. While the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and subsequent related 
legislation prohibited overt forms of gender discrimination in the United States, gender 
discrimination continues in more hidden and subtle forms in American society (Kuhn and Shen 
2013). The literature documents that American firms pay male employees higher wages and are 
more likely to promote male employees, relative to their female counterparts with similar 
credentials or output (Altonji and Blank 1999; Goldin and Rouse 2000). One recent study finds 
that female financial advisers in America are more likely to lose their jobs and less likely to find 
                                                 
1 https://www.hrw.org/report/2018/04/23/only-men-need-apply/gender-discrimination-job-advertisements-china. 
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new jobs, relative to their male peers (Egan, Matvos, and Seru 2017). In the Chinese context, 
Gao, Lin and Ma (2016) document that firms headquartered in more gender-discriminatory areas 
in China hire fewer female executives, who also face a higher likelihood of dismissal and receive 
lower compensation than their male counterparts. This finding is supported by a recent survey in 
which 86% of respondents believe that gender discrimination is prevalent in Asian companies.2 
Our first research question is whether gender discrimination exists in the financial analyst 
industry in the United States and China. 
We further examine whether a beauty bias exists and whether beauty has a moderating 
effect on gender discrimination. Studies document a significant beauty premium in the labor 
market. A large body of literature in economics and psychology suggests that people are often 
rewarded for their attractiveness. For example, physically attractive workers earn more than 
other workers (Frieze, Olson, and Russell 1991; Hamermesh and Biddle 1994) and good-looking 
job applicants are more likely to get calls from employers (Ruffle and Shtudiner 2015). 
Hamermesh, Meng, and Zhang (2002) find that beauty increases females’ compensation in 
Shanghai, China. Liu and Sierminska (2015) find that the beauty premium in China is the highest 
among the countries in their sample. Besides education, skills and experience, beauty can also be 
a selling point when Chinese companies try to market their current employees (Human Rights 
Watch 2018).  
On the other hand, some recent studies suggest that beauty may not always benefit 
employees. One example is attractive female discrimination, which is prevalent in U.S. culture. 
In this form of discrimination, women prefer female job applicants with low attractiveness over 
female applicants with high attractiveness, due to intra-sexual competition (Luxen and Van de 
                                                 
2 https://centres.insead.edu/emerging-markets-institute/documents/GenderReport_000.pdf 
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Vijver 2006). As a result, attractive female workers are perceived to face a penalty in the labor 
market. Agthe, Sporrle and Maner (2010) document that attractive candidates tend to be rated 
lower than unattractive candidates by same-sex evaluators. Ruffle and Shtudiner (2015), in an 
Israeli context, find that physically attractive female job candidates receive a lower rate of 
callbacks than other female candidates. It is therefore an empirical question whether beauty 
biases mitigate gender discrimination differently in the United States and China.  
In this paper, we focus on financial analysts for three reasons. First, studies suggest that 
financial analysis is a male-dominated profession (Kumar 2010; Fang and Huang 2017). 
Although many investment banks have adopted programs to promote work-life balance in an 
effort to attract female analysts, the impact of gender discrimination and beauty bias on 
opportunities for career advancement remains unknown. 
 Second, financial analysts are among the most important information intermediaries in 
the capital markets. Their profession is fiercely competitive and highly compensated in both the 
United States and China. In the United States each year, Institutional Investor magazine surveys 
a large number of buy-side fund managers and asks them to vote for the All-Star sell-side 
analysts. The results from these surveys are powerful determinants of sell-side analyst 
compensation and career advancement. In fact, Groysberg, Healy and Maber (2011) find that All-
Star analysts earn 61% higher compensation than other analysts. In China, similar to Institutional 
Investor in the United States, New Fortune Magazine sends surveys to buy-side money managers 
and conducts an annual All-Star analyst ranking for Chinese financial analysts. The base salary 
for the top ranked Chinese analysts is around U.S. $1 million, which is extremely high relative to 
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the average income level in China.3 In addition to the quantitative attributes, such as financial 
models and earnings estimates, the voting evaluation dimensions include qualitative attributes, 
such as industry knowledge, accessibility, responsiveness, and special service. While gender and 
beauty are not explicit parameters in the voting process, we conjecture that they will influence 
voting results in this competitive profession. 
Third, research on female financial analysts suggests that they are more likely to move to 
high-status brokerage firms and have better career advancement in the United States. This 
finding is consistent with the assertion that female analysts have stronger skills than their male 
counterparts due to self-selection (Kumar 2010). However, no studies have examined the effects 
of the combination of gender and beauty on career path, particularly across the two largest 
capital markets with different laws and cultures.  
We conduct empirical analyses separately on analysts in the United States and China. Our 
final sample consists of 1,121 U.S. analysts and 442 Chinese analysts participating in an All-Star 
analyst vote. Our measure of analyst beauty is based on the ratings of photos by human subjects. 
The photos of the U.S. analysts are extracted from their LinkedIn pages, whereas the photos of 
the Chinese analysts are provided by New Fortune Magazine and are the actual photos used for 
All-Star analyst voting.4 We manually identify the gender for each analyst from these photos. We 
employ the Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) service to rate the photos.5 For both the United 
                                                 
3 China Analysts’ Cut-Throat Fight for $1 Million Paycheck, Bloomberg News, September 28, 2017. 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-09-28/is-an-analyst-worth-75-000-or-1-million-how-china-decides 
4  All-Star analyst voting, started by Institutional Investor in 1972, has gained a significant reputation among 
investors over the past four decades. New Fortune Magazine has been hosting All-Star analyst voting in China each 
October since 2003. The awards ceremony is one of the most significant events in China’s financial industry. High 
resolution photos must be provided by analysts to register for the voting. The award was paused for a year in 2018 
but has resumed in 2019.  
5 MTurk is an online service through which individual workers can perform standardized tasks with compensation. 
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States and the Chinese analyst samples, each analyst photo is rated, on average, by 10 MTurk 
workers. 
We first examine whether gender affects the outcome of All-Star analyst voting. We find 
that female analysts are more likely to be voted as All-Stars in the United States, even though 
these female analysts do not have better forecasting skills than U.S. male analysts. This latter 
finding is consistent with the results of Fang and Huang (2017). Interestingly, we find that 
female analysts are more likely to face discrimination in China. They are less likely to be voted 
as All-Stars, compared with male analysts, despite the fact that Chinese female analysts show 
better-than-average skills and have lower forecast errors than their male counterparts.  
Next, we examine whether a beauty bias exists in All-Star analyst voting. The results 
show that beauty, on average, does not affect the likelihood of being voted as an All-Star analyst 
in the United States. In contrast, we find a beauty premium among Chinese analysts: good-
looking analysts are more likely to be voted as All-Stars in China. We find consistent results 
when analyst beauty is measured based on raw quantitative scores (scale from 1 to 100), 
quantitative scores mean-adjusted at the rater level, qualitative scores (below average, average, 
attractive, very attractive), and the residual scores from regressing the mean-adjusted quantitative 
scores on analysts’ age.  
We further examine whether beauty differentially affects the voting outcomes of male and 
female analysts. We find that attractive female U.S. analysts are discounted in the All-Star 
voting, with the “female” advantage muted for those female analysts with above average looks. 
In contrast, we find a beauty premium among Chinese female analysts. Attractive female 
Chinese analysts can overcome gender discrimination and have a similar likelihood of being 
voted as All-Stars, compared with male analysts. Given that attractive female analysts do not 
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perform differently from other female analysts, we conclude that beauty biases work in opposite 
directions in the United States and China. Our results persist after controlling for age and a host 
of widely documented analyst, brokerage, and firm characteristics, including forecast error, 
forecast frequency, forecast horizon, experience, portfolio complexity, brokerage size, firm size, 
market-to-book ratio, and return on assets.  
In additional tests, we carefully consider potentially correlated omitted variables and 
endogeneity concerns. Specifically, for omitted variables, we consider 1) industry knowledge and 
social connections, which may be correlated with gender and beauty, and 2) visibility, which 
may be correlated with beauty and contribute to All-Star competition success. With respect to 
endogeneity, we consider 1) the potential that some brokerages with more female (more 
beautiful) analysts are better at promoting their female (good-looking) analysts in the All-Star 
competitions, 2) the possibility that female analysts tend to follow specific industries, and 3) the 
likelihood that some good-looking Chinese analysts, with high income, large family net worth, or 
both may have undergone plastic surgery. In all tests, our results for gender and beauty are 
robust. We thus cautiously attribute our opposing results for gender and beauty to different 
cultures and legal environments in the United States versus China. We acknowledge that we 
cannot rule out the effects of other differences between the two countries.   
Our study contributes to several streams of literature. First, it provides international 
evidence on gender discrimination in the financial industry. There are substantial differences in 
the likelihood of being voted as an All-Star analyst across genders in different cultures. Although 
Chinese female analysts have stronger forecasting ability than their male counterparts, they 
receive less favorable career outcomes. We do not observe the same effect in the United States. 
Our finding implies that female analysts face more severe gender discrimination in China. 
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Second, this paper expands knowledge about the beauty premium. Most economics and 
psychology studies on beauty employ experimental settings, which may not be generalizable to a 
highly competitive profession. Our study provides large-sample empirical evidence documenting 
that the beauty premium is not universal. We find a beauty premium for All-Star analyst voting in 
China, but our results show that financial analysts with better looks do not enjoy a beauty 
premium in the United States.  
Finally, our study advances our understanding of the role of beauty in gender 
discrimination across two different countries. We find that beauty helps mute gender 
discrimination among female analysts in China. In contrast, we find that attractive female 
analysts in the U.S. financial industry are subject to a “beauty penalty.” The fact that this penalty 
does not exist among female Chinese analysts suggests that discrimination against attractive 
females is not universal. These results indicate that the interaction effect of gender discrimination 
and beauty bias is conditional and may be affected by culture.  
Section 2 discusses the related literature and develops the hypotheses. Section 3 describes 
the sample and the methodology. Section 4 presents the empirical results. Section 5 discusses the 
additional tests. Section 6 concludes. 
2. Related literature and hypotheses 
2.1 All-Star analyst voting 
In the United States each year, Institutional Investor magazine surveys a large number of 
buy-side fund managers and asks them to vote for the All-Star sell-side analysts. The vote is only 
open to a proprietary database, consisting of the global top fund managers of pension and hedge 
funds.1F Institutional Investor does not accept nominations for All-Star analysts. Rather, it allows 
the fund managers to vote for any sell-side participants who publish investment research and 
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distribute this research to clients during the period covered by the poll. The voting results are 
solely determined by a numerical score. As per Institutional Investor, the final score for each 
financial analyst is constructed by weighting each vote by the voter’s equity assets, fixed-income 
assets, or both.6 The voting results are powerful determinants of sell-side analysts’ payment and 
career advancement opportunities. Groysberg et al. (2011) find that U.S. All-Star analysts earn 
61% higher compensation than their peers. Brown, Call, Clement, and Sharp (2015) suggest that 
All-Star analysts gain more access to management and enjoy stronger bargaining power when 
they are promoted or change jobs. Analysts are known to lobby fund managers heavily before the 
voting (Hong and Kubik 2003).7 
Turning to the All-Star analyst voting in China, New Fortune Magazine has conducted an 
annual All-Star analyst ranking for Chinese financial analysts since 2003. Similar to Institutional 
Investor in the United States, New Fortune sends ballots to buy-side money managers in China 
each October and solicits their votes on top analysts in each industry sector based on the quality 
of their research and service. The buy-side firms consist of mutual funds, pension funds, 
insurance companies, banks, private equity, and foreign investment funds (QFII). The final 
ranking is based on the sum of weighted votes. 8  The process and outcome are audited by 
Deloitte, one of the world’s Big Four accounting firms. Both anecdotal evidence and formal 
surveys accompanying the voting suggest that the outcome serves as an important determinant of 
Chinese analysts’ compensation and career trajectories.    
                                                 
6 Details on the voting requirements and process can be found on the website of Institutional Investor magazine. 
http://www.institutionalinvestor.com/  
7 Anecdotal evidence suggests that analysts visit most funds to lobby for voting each year, including small funds that 
do not get analyst visits often and only receive reports periodically. 
8 Three analysts with the highest total scores will be recognized as stars for those industries with up to 20 analysts. 
Five analysts will be recognized as stars for industries with more than 20 analysts. 
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The All-Star analyst rankings in the United States and China thus provide an ideal setting 
to examine whether gender discrimination and beauty bias exist in the highly competitive 
financial industry. We can trust the integrity of the ranking process as its importance is not lost 
on buy-side analysts. They rely on the performance and skills of the sell-side analysts to analyze 
industries and firms. Their votes make a difference in determining which sell-side analysts are 
promoted. We can also confidently assert that the sell-side analyst industry is indeed highly 
competitive. Many analysts cover the same industry sectors, and the turnover rate within the 
industry is extremely high.  
2.2 Gender discrimination in the labor market 
Kuhn and Shen (2013) define gender discrimination as taking an action, such as paying a 
different wage or choosing to hire a person, based not on that person’s individual merit but on his 
or her gender. Many studies have investigated whether and where gender discrimination exists in 
the United States and in China, but few have specifically focused on the highly competitive 
financial industry. 
Prior to the passage of the federal civil rights legislation of the 1960s, overt forms of 
gender discrimination, such as stating that a particular gender was preferred in job postings, were 
common in the United States (Darity and Mason 1998; Kuhn and Shen 2013). The Civil Rights 
Act of 1964 and subsequent related legislation have prohibited these overt forms of gender 
discrimination. However, gender discrimination has persisted in more subtle forms in American 
society. For example, Altonji and Blank (1999) document that American companies pay male 
employees more than comparable female employees. Goldin and Rouse (2000) further find that 
male musicians are more likely to be promoted in symphony orchestras, relative to their female 
counterparts with similar credentials or outputs. Once gender information is hidden, the 
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probability that a female musician will be hired and advanced significantly increases. Similarly, 
Egan et al. (2017) show that female financial advisers are more likely to lose their jobs and are 
less likely to find new jobs, relative to their male counterparts in the United States. Consistent 
with these findings, a recent report from management consultant firm Oliver Wyman (2016) 
suggests that females face a glass ceiling in the financial services industry and lists it as the top 
ranked concern for females in the industry. Former FDIC chair Sheila Bair (2016) writes that the 
glass ceiling in the finance industry is barely cracked for females.  
Since the financial analyst industry is highly competitive and compensated in the United 
States, it is reasonable to conjecture that tangible skill sets may dominate the influence of female 
discrimination. Some literature supports this notion. For example, Kumar (2010) suggests that 
U.S. female analysts are actually more likely to move to high-status brokerage firms and have 
better career advancement, because female analysts have stronger skills than their male 
counterparts due to self-selection. Li, Sullivan, Xu and Gao (2013) suggest that gender does not 
hurt female analysts’ star rankings and job mobility among brokerages. In contrast to these 
findings, Fang and Huang (2017) find that male analysts receive higher benefits from social 
capital than female analysts in the U.S. labor market. Overall, these studies indicate that female 
analysts, on balance, do not have worse career advancement opportunities than male analysts in 
the United States. 
In contrast, overt forms of gender discrimination remain common in China. Kuhn and 
Shen (2013) find that over one-third of Chinese companies, seeking highly educated urban 
employees, have one Internet job posting stating a preferred gender. These overt forms of gender 
discrimination decline when job skill requirements increase. Interestingly, the researchers further 
find that the percentage of Internet job postings preferring males versus females is approximately 
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the same. According to INSEAD (2018), 86% of respondents believe that gender discrimination 
is still prevalent in Asian companies. Recently, Human Rights Watch analyzed over 36,000 
Chinese job postings on company websites and social media platforms. Many of these job 
postings specify a requirement or preference for males, including job postings from Chinese 
government departments and agencies. Specifically, 99% of job postings from Railway Public 
Security Bureaus, 41% of job postings from the National Bureau of Statistics, 40% of job 
postings from the Maritime Safety Administration, and 32% of job postings from the Civil 
Aviation Administration specify male preferred or male-only. Many large companies in various 
industries specify gender preference in their job postings as well. For example, a 2016 job 
posting for a film program manager at Baidu states: “strong logical reasoning ability, effective 
execution skills … men and manly women only.”9 An internship at Citic Group, one of China’s 
largest state-owned investment companies, describes its ideal candidate as “high productivity, 
hardworking and swift, able to bear relatively high workload and pressure, male students 
preferred.” Another job posting for a chief financial officer at an energy firm in Beijing states: 
“Man preferred. From any industry. Bachelor’s degree or above. Age between 40 and 50.”  
Besides these overt forms of gender discrimination, hidden forms of gender 
discrimination exist in China as well. Gao et al. (2016) document that firms headquartered in 
more gender-discriminatory areas hire fewer female executives in China and that these female 
executives receive lower compensation and face a higher likelihood of dismissal than their male 
counterparts. These overt or hidden forms of gender discrimination reflect common stereotypes 
about females: that they are less intellectually, physically and psychologically capable than 
males, or that they are not fully committed to their jobs because some will leave to have families.  
                                                 
9 “Manly women” is slang in China used to refer to women showing “manly” traits, such as being strong and 
independent (Human Rights Watch 2018). 
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Based on the preceding discussion, we predict that gender does not affect an analyst’s 
likelihood of being voted as an All-Star in the United States but affects it in China. Despite the 
different predictions, we state our first hypothesis in null form, as follows. 
H1: Gender does not affect the likelihood of being voted as an All-Star analyst in the 
United States or China. 
2.3 Beauty premium in the labor market 
As with gender preference, U.S. employers may not state their preferences regarding 
physical appearance in job postings since the passage of the federal civil rights legislation in the 
1960s. However, a significant body of literature in economics and psychology finds a beauty 
premium in the U.S. labor market. Hamermesh and Biddle (1994) published a seminal work 
which examines the effect of beauty in the labor market. In their paper, a “beauty premium” is 
defined as the extra compensation earned by physically attractive workers, compared with 
workers with below-average looks. They find that good-looking workers earn 10% to 15% more 
than plain-looking workers. Biddle and Hamermesh (1998) further focus on law school graduates 
as a specific profession and find that good-looking attorneys earn more than their less attractive 
peers. Deryugina and Shurchkov (2015) find that the beauty premium is more pronounced in 
bargaining tasks.  
Research also suggests that beauty can predict election results. Todorov, Mandisodza, 
Goren and Hall (2005) show that a politician’s appearance predicts the winner in 71.6% of U.S. 
Senate elections. Berggren, Jordahl, and Poutvaara (2010) ask 10,011 survey respondents to rate 
the physical attractiveness of 1,929 Finnish political candidates. Their finding suggests that a one 
standard deviation increase in physical attractiveness is associated with a 20% increase in the 
number of votes for non-incumbent candidates. A few recent studies also document a beauty 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3347968
13 
 
premium in corporate settings. For example, Halford and Hsu (2014) find that physically 
attractive CEOs are correlated with higher returns upon their job announcements and better 
acquirer returns on acquisition announcements. Graham, Harvey, and Puri (2017) show that 
CEOs with a “look of competence” enjoy higher compensation.  
In China, stating that a particular type of appearance is preferred in job postings is 
common. For example, a company in Chongqing states in their job posts that “base salary is 
1,000 RMB if the candidate is taller than 160cm; 1,500 RMB if the candidate is taller than 
165cm.” 10 In its 2018 report, Human Rights Watch revealed that some job postings require 
female applicants to have certain physical attributes with respect to height, weight, voice, and 
facial appearance, which are irrelevant to job duties. For example, a job posting in 2015 for court 
assistants by the Daxing District Court in Beijing states: “associate degree or above … have 
proper looks … clear enunciation … and under 35-year-old, female.” A job posting for a 
receptionist internship position at the recruiting company, Zhilian Zhaopin, states: “nice 
appearance and temperament, sweet and beautiful voice.”  
Other postings use the physical attributes of companies’ current female employees to 
attract male applicants. For example, some of China’s giant technology companies, such as 
Tencent, Baidu, and Alibaba, have repeatedly published job posts boasting that there are 
“beautiful female colleagues” or “goddesses” working for their firms (Human Rights Watch 
Report 2018).11 Besides education, skills, and experience, beauty can also be a selling point 
when companies try to market their employees. Companies and media often use phrases such as 
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“beauty CEO” or “beauty analyst” to describe their employees. 12 Consistent with anecdotal 
evidence, Liu and Sierminska (2015) find that the beauty premium in China is the highest among 
the countries in their sample. 
Studies provide several potential explanations for the beauty premium. First, the beauty 
premium may be driven by discrimination from employers, customers, or both. For example, 
physically attractive workers are wrongly considered more capable. In addition, customers or 
other related parties can also overestimate the abilities of physically attractive workers and thus 
increase beauty’s productivity as a result. Second, beauty may actually be an indirect measure of 
unobservable skill or ability. For example, Mobius and Rosenblat (2006) find that physically 
attractive workers have better oral skills, which contribute to the beauty premium. Third, self-
selection can drive the beauty premium. Good-looking workers are more likely to self-select into 
high-paying professions.  
 Based on the preceding discussion, we predict that beauty increases an analyst’s 
likelihood of being voted as an All-Star both in the United States and in China. We state our 
second hypothesis in null form, as follows. 
H2: Beauty does not affect the likelihood of being voted as an All-Star analyst in the 
United States or China. 
2.4 Interaction effect of gender and beauty in the labor market 
Beauty may not always benefit employees. Luxen and Van de Vijver (2006) find that 
women (both human resource professionals and students) prefer female job applicants with low 
attractiveness over female applicants with high attractiveness. Agthe et al. (2010) document that 
attractive candidates tend to be rated lower by same-sex evaluators than unattractive candidates. 
                                                 
12 http://finance.sina.com.cn/money/fund/jjzl/2016-04-14/doc-ifxriqqx2391894.shtml 
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Even though the financial analyst profession is male-dominated and such discrimination by 
same-sex evaluators may not apply to female analysts, studies in the United States suggest that 
beautiful females are more likely to be egotistical, snobbish, and unsympathetic. Andreoni and 
Petrie (2008) find experimental evidence that beauty has different effects on male and female 
subjects.  
In a Chinese context, Kuhn and Shen (2013) find that many Chinese companies have 
explicit requests for age, height, and beauty in their Internet job postings and these requests for 
attractiveness are highly correlated with explicit requests for female applicants. As another 
example, Hamermesh et al. (2002) find that beauty increases females’ compensation in Shanghai, 
China. We thus generate our third null hypothesis, as follows. 
H3: There is no differential impact of beauty on the relationship between gender and the 
likelihood of being voted as an All-Star analyst in the United States or China. 
3. Sample selection and beauty measure 
3.1 Sample Selection  
We use samples of U.S. and Chinese analysts to test our hypotheses. Panel A of Table 1 
shows the sample selection procedure for the U.S. analyst sample. We first retrieve the analysts’ 
names from the Thomson Reuters Institutional Brokers’ Estimate System (I/B/E/S) 
recommendation file, collect their gender information and photos from their LinkedIn profiles 
and then retain the analysts with high-quality photos for the rating process. The resulting analyst 
photos are reasonably standardized, with 1) 94% of the photos featuring head and upper body, 2) 
93% of the photos being color and 3) 90% of the analysts wearing a suit, shirt, or dress.13 
                                                 
13 In a robustness check, we repeat our empirical analysis with the analyst photos that meet all three conditions. The 
inferences remain unchanged.   
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Specifically, among the 4,377 names of U.S. sell-side analysts available from I/B/E/S for the 
year 2014, we can identify 1,427 analysts with LinkedIn profiles and high-quality photos. These 
1,427 analysts map to 3,695 analyst-years for the period 2013 to 2015. The final U.S. analyst 
sample consists of 2,709 analyst-years, representing 1,121 distinct analysts. The smaller sample 
size is due to a combination of factors, including 1) I/B/E/S data restrictions, 2) Compustat data 
restrictions, and 3) the requirement for at least one All-Star analyst in our sample for a given 
industry and year. All-Star ranking data is obtained from Institutional Investor magazine.   
Panel B of Table 1 shows the similar sample selection procedure for the Chinese analysts. 
We start with 922 candidates who are registered in the Chinese star analyst voting for 2015. New 
Fortune magazine exclusively provides us with the names and photos of these candidates, with 
the photos being the actual photos used in the All-Star voting. After excluding candidates that 
hold a sales manager title or work in the macroeconomy, strategy, financial engineering, or fixed 
income sectors, we are left with 585 sell-side analysts. There are 1,274 analyst-years associated 
with these analysts, based on the information available in the GTA China Stock Market & 
Accounting Research (CSMAR) database, for 2013 to 2015. After excluding observations with 
group photos and meeting data restrictions similar to those applied to the U.S. analyst sample, we 
arrive at the final China analyst sample, consisting of 960 analyst-years representing 442 unique 
analysts for the period 2013 to 2015. 
3.2 Measuring beauty 
Our measure of analyst beauty is based on the analysts’ facial attractiveness as perceived 
by human raters. Each analyst photo is rated on two complementary dimensions: (1) 
quantitative—a scale from 1 to 100—and (2) qualitative—below average, average, attractive, 
and very attractive. 




The ratings of analyst beauty are obtained from Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk), a 
crowdsourcing Internet marketplace that enables businesses and individuals to coordinate the use 
of human intelligence to perform tasks. In this marketplace, workers can browse jobs and 
complete them for a monetary payment set by the employer. As noted above, each analyst photo 
is rated on both a quantitative and a qualitative dimension. 
Each analyst photo is rated, on average, by 10 MTurk workers. The actual number of 
ratings per photo varies slightly because a random number generator is used to select photos for 
each rater. We measure analyst beauty as the average of the independent quantitative scores 
received for the analyst, after excluding raters of inconsistent rating quality and dropping the 
highest and lowest rating for each analyst.14 The use of a composite rating is consistent with 
prior work, which shows that the estimated coefficients on beauty are smaller when based on the 
evaluations of a single rater rather than a composite measure. Composite measures are more 
reliable because they are based on aggregations of correlated responses. 
One potential issue with the raw quantitative beauty measure is that each rater may have 
different benchmarks for beauty, which would add noise to the measure. To address this concern, 
in the main analyses, we use the quantitative scores mean-adjusted at the individual-rater level to 
proxy for analyst beauty. Specifically, we subtract the mean quantitative score given by a rater 
from each quantitative score received from the same rater. Next, we recalculate the average of 
                                                 
14 To control the quality of rating results, we only include raters’ scores in our final sample if their ratings are of 
consistent quality. We proxy for consistent quality in two ways: (1) the correlation between quantitative and 
qualitative ratings for a given rater is at least 0.60 and (2) the standard deviation of quantitative scores for all 
photographs coded by an individual is at least six (quantitative scores range from 0 to 100). While these cutoffs are 
admittedly somewhat arbitrary, they seem reasonable based on our review of the raw data. 
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such mean-adjusted quantitative scores for each analyst.15 In un-tabulated sensitivity analyses, 
we complement the mean-adjusted quantitative beauty measure with the alternative beauty 
measures based on the raw quantitative and qualitative scores. The latter measure is calculated as 
the average independent qualitative rating received for each analyst (i.e., we code “below 
average” as 1, “average” as 2, “attractive” as 3, and “very attractive” as 4). This alternative 
measure also addresses the concern that raters may give different quantitative scores to analysts. 
In addition to the MTurk ratings, we obtain students’ ratings as a robustness check. The student 
subjects consist of 610 undergraduate and MBA business students from a major research 
university in North America.16  
3.2.2 Summary demographics of raters 
The average age of the MTurk raters is 36 with 57% being male. Regarding ethnicity, 
64% of the raters are white/Caucasian, 9% are African-American, and 20% are Asian. To 
examine the effect of these demographic characteristics on the ratings of analyst beauty, we 
regress the raw quantitative scores of analyst beauty on raters’ age, gender, and ethnicity. The 
results show that the raters’ age is positively associated with the raw quantitative scores of 
analyst beauty (p-value < 0.1), but their gender and ethnicity have no significant influence. These 
results are consistent with research that suggests little cross-cultural variation in people’s 
perceptions of which facial characteristics are attractive (e.g., Perrett, May, and Yoshikawa 1994; 
Langlois, Kalakanis, Rubenstein, Larson, Hallam, and Smoot 2000). Importantly, when we 
regress the mean-adjusted quantitative scores of analyst beauty on the raters’ age, gender, and 
                                                 
15 The mean-adjusted quantitative scores remove the potential effects of a rater’s demographic characteristics. See 
next subsection for details.  
16  These students were sourced from an introductory managerial accounting course, an advanced financial 
accounting course, and an accounting theory course. Ethics clearance was obtained from the Research Ethics Board 
of the university. For the U.S. analyst sample, each photo is rated, on average, by 20 students. For the Chinese 
analyst sample, each photo is rated by 67 students on average. Our results are robust to using student raters.  
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ethnicity, none of these demographic characteristics has a significant effect. As such, we believe 
that the mean-adjusted quantitative beauty measure is sufficiently unbiased. In addition, as raters 
are highly unlikely to know the identities of the individuals they are rating, we are not concerned 
that familiarity will bias the results.  
4. Hypothesis tests 
4.1 Test of H1: does gender affect the likelihood of being voted as an All-Star analyst? 
4.1.1 Empirical specification 
Our first research question is whether gender discrimination exists in the All-Star analyst 
voting process in the United States and China. Before testing the first hypothesis, we explore 
whether the male and female analysts perform differently on earnings forecasts. Although it is 
not our primary interest, the test follows the theme of the analyst literature in accounting and the 
results may help us distinguish between 1) the analyst ability explanation (due to self-selection of 
female analysts) and 2) the gender discrimination explanation (if a significant gender effect is 
later observed in the All-Star analyst voting). 
We use average relative earnings forecast error to proxy for an analyst’s performance and 
regress this proxy on gender, controlling for the analyst’s age, earnings forecasting activities, 
research portfolio complexity, experience, brokerage resources and reputation, and the 
characteristics of the firms followed. Specifically, we estimate the following OLS model. 
 
AFEi,t   = 
 
β0 + β1 · Femalei + β2 · Agei,t + β3 · Horizoni,t + β4 · Freqi,t + β5 · BSizei,t  
+ β6 · NFirmi,t + β7 · NIndi,t + β8 · GExpi,t + β9 · FExpi,t + β10 · Sizei,t  





AFE is the analyst’s average relative forecast error for the firms followed in year t, where 
the relative forecast error is the analyst’s most recent forecast error (i.e., |analyst earnings 
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forecast − actual earnings|), relative to the most recent forecast errors of all analysts following 
the firm in year t and ranges from 0 to 100 (Clement and Tse 2003).17 Female is an indicator 
variable set to one for female analysts and zero for male analysts.  
For the U.S. analyst sample, we measure an analyst’s age based on the year the analyst 
graduated from college or university. Specifically, we proxy for analyst’s age as: [22 + (current 
year – graduation year)]. We are able to collect the educational backgrounds from LinkedIn for 
80% (i.e., 892 out of 1,121) of the analysts. We then estimate the linear relationship between age, 
general experience as an analyst (GExp), Female, and the interaction term of GExp and Female 
in order to estimate the ages of analysts with missing education information. For the China 
analyst sample, New Fortune Magazine provides us with the age for 76% (i.e., 337 out of 442) of 
the analysts. We collect the educations of the remaining analysts from the Securities Association 
of China website. 18 We estimate an analyst’s age as [22/24/27 + (current year – graduation 
year)], depending on whether the analyst’s highest degree is a bachelor’s, master’s, or doctoral 
degree.   
Regarding the other control variables, earnings forecast horizon (Horizon) is the analyst’s 
average relative forecast horizon for the firms followed in year t, where the relative forecast 
horizon is the analyst’s forecast horizon (i.e., the number of days between the analyst’s earnings 
forecast and the firm’s actual earnings announcement), relative to the forecast horizons of all 
analysts following the firm in year t and ranges from 0 to 100. Earnings forecast frequency 
                                                 
17 We multiply all relative measures by 100 to make the coefficient estimates more interpretable. 
18 http://exam.sac.net.cn/pages/registration/sac-publicity-report.html (in Chinese). 
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(Freq) is the analyst’s average relative forecast frequency for the firms followed in year t, where 
the relative forecast frequency is the analyst’s forecast frequency, relative to the forecast 
frequencies of all analysts following the firm in year t and ranges from 0 to 100. The analyst’s 
research portfolio complexity is measured by the number of firms followed (NFirm) and the 
number of industries followed (NInd) in year t. The analyst’s experience is measured by his or 
her general experience as an analyst (GExp) as well as the average number of years that the 
analyst has followed the firms in the research portfolio (FExp) (Clement 1999). In addition, we 
control for brokerage resources and reputation by including brokerage size (BSize) in the model, 
measured by the number of analysts employed by the brokerage in year t. We further control for 
the characteristics of an average firm in the analyst’s research portfolio in year t. These 
characteristics include 1) average firm size (Size), measured as the mean of the natural logarithm 
of market value of the firms followed; 2) average market-to-book ratio of the firms followed 
(MTB); and 3) average return on assets of the firms followed (ROA) by the analyst in year t. 
These firm characteristics reflect analysts’ coverage selection and, to some extent, the potential 
market impact of their equity research. Finally, we control for industry-year fixed effects to 
facilitate a within-industry comparison. 
To test H1, we regress an analyst’s All-Star award status on gender, controlling for the 
analyst’s age, performance, earnings forecasting activities, research portfolio complexity and 
experience, brokerage resources and reputation, and the characteristics of the firms followed. 
Specifically, we estimate the following probit model. 
 
Star_Awardi,t  = 
 
β0 + β1 · Femalei + β2 · Agei,t + β3 · CARi,t + β4 · AFEi,t + β5 · Horizoni,t  
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+ β11 · FExpi,t + β12 · Sizei,t + β13 · MTBi,t + β14 · ROAi,t  
+ Industry-Year Fixed Effects + εi,t, 
 
(2) 
where Star_Award denotes All-Star analyst award status, an indicator variable set to one if a U.S. 
(Chinese) analyst is ranked in the top three or runner-up by Institutional Investor (New Fortune 
Magazine) and zero otherwise. We additionally control for the price impact of the analyst’s stock 
recommendations (CAR), measured as the average three-day abnormal cumulative stock returns 
surrounding the analyst’s stock recommendations for the firms covered in year t.19  Finally, we 
include industry-year fixed effects to alleviate the concern that analysts with certain 
characteristics tend to be assigned to cover specific industries. Female is our variable of interest. 
All other control variables are as previously defined.  
4.1.2 Results 
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for the variables used in the empirical analysis. In 
the U.S. (China) analyst sample, 9% (37%) of the analysts are awarded All-Star status and 9% 
(24%) of the analysts are female.20, 21 Figure 1 shows that the percentages of female analysts for 
both samples are relatively stable over time. Regarding the beauty measures, the average raw 
quantitative beauty measure is 49.05 (49.61). On average, analysts cover 13 (20) firms and 4 (5) 
industries and have 8.5 (2.2) years of experience as financial analysts. The continuous variables 
                                                 
19 In a robustness check for the U.S. sample, we calculate CAR separately for recommendation upgrades/downgrades 
and reiterations and include both in the model. We are not able to conduct this separation for the China sample as 
84.3% of these analysts either: 1) issue reiteration recommendations only or 2) only issue recommendations once a 
year.   
20 The percentage of All-Star analysts is different between the two samples mainly because we use all analysts in 
I/B/E/S to construct the U.S. analyst sample and the analyst candidates in the voting ballot (rather than all analysts in 
CSMAR) to construct the China analyst sample. 
21 The difference between the percentage of female analysts across two countries can be affected by many factors, 
including the female labor force participation. In 2015, China's female labor participation rate is ranked #28 
(62.61%) in the world.  The US is ranked #57 (55.83%).  
https://www.theglobaleconomy.com/rankings/female_labor_force_participation/ 
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are winsorized at the top and bottom 1%. The standard errors are clustered by brokerage and by 
year. 
Table 3 reports the results from estimating model (1). In the U.S. analyst sample, we find 
that the coefficient estimate on Female is statistically insignificant, suggesting that U.S. female 
analysts do not perform better than their male counterparts. This result is consistent with the 
findings of Fang and Huang (2017). In contrast, in our China analyst sample, we find that the 
coefficient estimate on Female is significant and negative (p-value < 0.05), suggesting that the 
Chinese female analysts tend to perform better than their male counterparts. In economic terms, 
female analysts in China are 2% more accurate than their male counterparts, which is 
approximately 6% of the sample mean. 
Table 4 reports the results from estimating model (2). In the U.S. analyst sample, we find 
a significant and positive coefficient estimate on Female (p-value < 0.1). This result suggests 
that, after controlling for age and analyst performance, U.S. female analysts in our sample are 
more likely than their male counterparts to be voted as All-Stars. The marginal effect of Female 
in column 1 indicates that the probability of being voted as a star analyst is higher by 1.0%, 
approximately 11% of the sample mean (Table 2). In contrast, in the China analyst sample, we 
find a significant and negative coefficient estimate on Female (p-value < 0.01), suggesting that 
the Chinese female analysts are discriminated against in the All-Star analyst voting. The 
marginal effect of Female in column 2 indicates that the probability of being voted as a star 
analyst is lower by 3.3%, which is approximately 9% of the sample mean. Collectively, these 
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results reject H1 and imply that female analysts face significant discrimination in the All-Star 
analyst voting in China whereas the effect is opposite in the United States.  
Turning to the control variables, we document some common determinants of All-Star 
analyst award status in both countries. Analysts are more likely to be voted as All-Stars when 
they work for larger brokerages, follow more firms but fewer industries, and follow larger firms. 
Nevertheless, some differences also exist. Older analysts are more likely to be voted as All-Stars 
in the United States but not in China. In addition, the voters in the United States seem to place 
more weight on analysts’ performance than the voters in China do.  
Overall, we find that female analysts are discriminated against in opposing directions in 
the two countries. In particular, U.S. voters discriminate in favor of female analysts, whereas 
those in China discriminate against female analysts.  
4.2 Test of H2: does beauty affect the likelihood of being voted as an All-Star analyst?  
4.2.1 Summary statistics for beauty measures 
Panel A of Table 5 reports the summary statistics of the raw quantitative beauty scores 
based on either MTurk or student ratings. We find that both the mean and median of the MTurk 
ratings are approximately 50 for both the U.S. and China analyst samples. In contrast, we find 
that students’ ratings, on average, are downward-biased, with mean raw scores of approximately 
44 (41) for the U.S. (China) analyst sample. We consider the MTurk ratings to be more 
representative for our empirical analyses, so we only report results based on MTurk ratings. 
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Importantly, while students are more conservative than MTurk workers in their ratings, the 
relative rankings for analysts are remarkably consistent across both groups of raters.22 
Panel B of Table 5 reports the summary statistics of the raw quantitative beauty scores, 
age, and general experience by gender and by All-Star analyst award status. When classifying 
analysts by gender, we find that female analysts, on average, are perceived to be better looking 
than male analysts. The average beauty scores for male and female U.S. (China) analysts are 
47.94 and 59.93 (45.53 and 62.33), respectively, and this difference is statistically significant (p-
values < 0.01). Next, when classifying analysts by All-Star analyst award status, we find that 
there is a significant difference between the raw quantitative beauty scores of star and nonstar 
Chinese analysts (p-value < 0.1), but not for U.S. analysts. In the United States, female analysts 
tend to be younger and less experienced than male analysts, and star analysts tend to be older and 
more experienced than nonstar analysts. We do not observe such differences, however, in China.   
Since the focus of the paper is gender and beauty, we further explore whether female 
analysts choose specific industries to follow. Panel C of Table 5 reports the industries with the 
highest percentages of female analyst coverage. The results suggest that brokerages indeed tend 
to assign female analysts to cover certain industries. Based on the industries defined by 
Institutional Investor during our sample period, the industries with highest female analyst 
coverage in the U.S. analyst sample are (1) food, beverage, and household and personal care 
products; (2) retailing/department stores and specialty soft lines; and (3) retailing/food and drug 
chains. In contrast, based on the industries defined by New Fortune magazine for the China 
sample, the industries with highest female analyst coverage are (1) textile garments and apparel, 
                                                 
22 In Section 3.2.2, we document that the raters’ age is positively associated with the raw quantitative scores of 
analyst beauty, which may explain why students’ ratings are more conservative. The correlations between the MTurk 
and student ratings are +0.70 for the U.S sample and +0.86 for the China sample. 
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(2) services (hotel, restaurants, leisure), and (3) papermaking and paper products. Industries with 
significant overlap for female analysts across the two countries include clothing and service.  
4.2.2 Empirical specification 
The second research question is whether a beauty bias exists in the All-Star analyst voting 
process in the United States and China. As in Section 4.1., we follow the analyst literature and 
use an analyst’s average relative earnings forecast error to proxy for the analyst’s performance 
and examine its association with beauty. Specifically, we estimate the following OLS model. 
 
AFEi,t   = 
 
β0 + β1 · Beautyi + β2 · Agei,t + β3 · Horizoni,t + β4 · Freqi,t + β5 · BSizei,t  
+ β6 · NFirmi,t + β7 · NIndi,t + β8 · GExpi,t + β9 · FExpi,t + β10 · Sizei,t  





where Beauty is the analyst’s facial attractiveness, measured as the average of the mean-adjusted 
quantitative scores received for the analyst, as explained in Section 3. When examining the 
incremental effect of Beauty, it is especially important to control for Age because there exists a 
negative correlation between Age and Beauty: the correlations are -0.25 and -0.24 for the U.S. 
male and female analysts, respectively, and -0.31 and -0.29 for the Chinese male and female 
analysts. All other variables are as previously defined. 
To test H2, we regress an analyst’s All-Star award status on beauty, again controlling for 
the analyst’s age, performance, earnings forecasting activities, research portfolio complexity and 
experience, brokerage resources and reputation, and the characteristics of the firms followed. 
Specifically, we estimate the following probit model. 
 
Star_Awardi,t  = 
 
β0 + β1 · Beautyi + β2 · Agei,t + β3 · CARi,t + β4 · AFEi,t + β5 · Horizoni,t  
+ β6 · Freqi,t + β7 · BSizei,t + β8 · NFirmi,t + β9 · NIndi,t + β10 · GExpi,t 
+ β11 · FExpi,t + β12 · Sizei,t + β13 · MTBi,t + β14 · ROAi,t  
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where Beauty is our variable of interest. All other control variables are as previously defined. H2 
predicts β1 to be insignificant. 
4.2.3 Results 
Table 6 reports the results from estimating model (3). In both the U.S. and China analyst 
samples, we find an insignificant coefficient estimate on Beauty, suggesting that good-looking 
analysts on average do not perform better in earnings forecasts.  
Table 7 reports the results from estimating model (4). In the U.S. analyst sample, we find 
that the coefficient estimate on Beauty is statistically insignificant, suggesting that good-looking 
analysts do not benefit from their attractiveness in the All-Star analyst voting. However, in the 
China analyst sample, we find a significant and positive coefficient estimate on Beauty (p-value 
< 0.01), suggesting that good-looking analysts are more likely to be voted All-Stars. 23  In 
economic terms, a one standard deviation increase in Beauty is associated with a 3.2% increase 
in the probability of being voted as a star analyst, which is approximately 9% of the sample 
mean. Collectively, these results reject H2.   
Although the literature suggests that physical attractiveness is correlated with many 
positive attributes, such as ambitiousness, industriousness, confidence, popularity, and 
intelligence (Eagly, Ashmore, Makhijani, and Longo 1991; Feingold 1992), we do not observe a 
beauty premium in the U.S. analyst sample. The reason for this lack of a beauty premium is 
likely that the background and record of each analyst’s relative performance are readily available 
to voters, so voters may place more weight on direct indicators of analysts’ abilities (e.g., 
                                                 
23 All of these results hold when we replace Beauty with the raw quantitative or the qualitative beauty measure. 
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research output) than on indirect indicators (e.g., facial attractiveness). In contrast, the analysts in 
the China sample are relatively young and inexperienced, with an average general experience of 
2.2 years, so the voters may still place some weight on indirect indicators of analysts’ abilities, 
such as beauty. 
Overall, our results suggest that, on average, the beauty premium in All-Star analyst 
voting exists in China but not in the United States. As such, we conclude that the beauty 
premium is not a universal phenomenon. 
4.3. Test of H3: does an interaction effect between gender and beauty exist in the All-Star analyst 
voting? 
4.3.1 Empirical specification 
 We further examine whether there is an interaction effect between beauty and gender on 
the likelihood of receiving an All-Star analyst award, given the competitive and professional 
nature of the financial analyst industry. Before testing H3, we first augment model (1) by 
including the interaction effect between Female and Beauty and the interaction effect between 
Male and Beauty. We include Beauty separately for female and male analysts because the mean 
beauty scores of the two groups are significantly different. 24  Specifically, we estimate the 
following OLS model. 
 
AFEi,t   = 
 
β0 + β1 · Femalei + β2 · Femalei × Beautyi + β3 · Malei × Beautyi + β4 · Agei,t 
+ β5 · Horizoni,t + β6 · Freqi,t + β7 · BSizei,t + β8 · NFirmi,t + β9 · NIndi,t  
+ β10 · GExpi,t + β11 · FExpi,t + β12 · Sizei,t + β13 · MTBi,t + β14 · ROAi,t  






                                                 
24 The inferences remain similar if we directly interact Female and Beauty or if we estimate models (3) and (4) 
separately for male and female analysts. 
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To test H3, we augment model (2) by including the interaction effect between Female and 
Beauty and the interaction effect between Male and Beauty. Specifically, we estimate the 
following probit model. 
 All variables are as previously defined. 
4.3.2. Results 
Table 8 reports the results from the estimation of model (5). In the U.S. analyst sample, 
we continue to find an insignificant coefficient estimate on Female, and we find no significant 
interaction between gender and beauty on U.S. analysts’ performance. In the China analyst 
sample, we continue to find a significant and negative coefficient estimate on Female (p-value < 
0.1), again suggesting that Chinese female analysts tend to perform better than their male 
counterparts. Meanwhile, we find that there is no significant interaction between gender and 
beauty on Chinese analysts’ performance. 
Table 9 reports the results from the estimation of model (6). In the U.S. analyst sample, 
we continue to find a significant and positive coefficient estimate on Female (p-value < 0.05), 
suggesting that U.S. female analysts on average are treated more favorably in the All-Star analyst 
voting. We also find a significant and negative interaction effect between Female and Beauty (p-
value < 0.01), suggesting that good-looking female analysts not only receive no premium for 
their attractiveness but are also penalized in the All-Star analyst voting. In economic terms, 
Star_Awardi,t  = β0 + β1 · Femalei + β2 · Femalei × Beautyi + β3 · Malei × Beautyi  
+  β4 · Agei,t + β5 · CARi,t + β6 · AFEi,t + β7 · Horizoni,t + β8 · Freqi,t  
+ β9 · BSizei,t + β10 · NFirmi,t + β11 · NIndi,t + β12 · GExpi,t  
+ β13 · FExpi,t + β14 · Sizei,t + β15 · MTBi,t + β16 · ROAi,t  
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Female is associated with a 1.5% increase in the probability of being voted as a star analyst. 
Based on the distribution of Beauty, the effect of Female is muted for a female analyst with 
attractiveness in the top decile among all female analysts in the United States. 
As a sharp contrast, in the China analyst sample, we find a significant and negative 
coefficient estimate on Female (p-value < 0.01) and a significant and positive coefficient 
estimate on the interaction term of Female and Beauty (p-value < 0.01). This evidence suggests 
that, while there is gender discrimination against Chinese female analysts in the All-Star analyst 
voting, good-looking female analysts are subject to less discrimination. In economic terms, 
Female is associated with a 13.2% decrease in the probability of being voted as a star analyst. 
Based on the distribution of Beauty, a female analyst with attractiveness in the top quartile 
among all female analysts in China can negate gender discrimination.25  
In sum, these results reject H3 and suggest that gender and beauty discrimination function 
differently in the two countries.  
5. Possible explanations and additional tests 
5.1. Brokerages’ promotion efforts 
 In an untabulated analysis, we observe variations in the percentage of female analysts and the 
average beauty ratings of analysts across brokerage firms in both the U.S. and China samples. As 
such, our results could be biased by the endogenous matching between analysts and brokerage 
firms. In other words, the female premium observed in the United States could be driven by 
                                                 
25 In this regression, we control for Age. In an untabulated analysis, we regress Beauty on Age and use the residual to 
proxy for analysts’ facial attractiveness. The results are robust.  
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brokerages that are better at promoting female analysts, and the female beauty premium observed 
in China could be driven by brokerages that are better at promoting good-looking analysts.  
  To address this concern, we construct two measures of brokerages’ promotion efforts. 
The first measure, Female%, is the percentage of female analysts for a given broker and year. 
The second measure, Avg Beauty, is the mean of Beauty of all analysts for a given broker and 
year. The rationale is that the promotion efforts for female or good-looking analysts as well as 
the net benefits of doing so should be a function of how many of such analysts a brokerage has. 
Therefore we augment model (6) by additionally controlling for Female% and Avg Beauty. In 
untabulated results, we find an insignificant effect of Female% and a significant and positive 
effect of Avg Beauty on Star_Award for both samples (p-value < 0.05 or better). While the latter 
result is consistent with brokerages’ promotion efforts, the results of Female and its interaction 
effect with Beauty are robust to the findings reported in Table 9.26 
5.2 Industry expertise 
  Analysts’ industry knowledge has been ranked by buy-side clients as one of the most 
important analyst attributes, ahead of earnings forecasts and stock selection (Groysberg et al. 
2011; Brown et al. 2015). Therefore, while we control for analysts’ earnings forecast accuracy 
and price impact of stock recommendations in the tests of All-Star status, we seek to further 
control for analysts’ industry expertise to address the possibility that female analysts in the 
United States and China may possess different amounts of industry knowledge, thus leading to 
differential voting outcomes. We proxy for analysts’ industry expertise using (1) Industry_Exp, 
                                                 
26 All untabulated results discussed in Section 5 will be tabulated in an online appendix posted on SSRN.  
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defined as the number of years an analyst has followed her main industry; (2) Industry_Cover%, 
defined as the percentage of firms in an analyst’s main industry that are covered by the analyst in 
the year; (3) Industry_EPS%, defined as the percentage of earnings forecasts in an analyst’s main 
industry that are issued by the analyst in the year; and (4) Industry_Rec%, defined as the 
percentage of stock recommendations in an analyst’s main industry that are issued by the analyst 
in the year. 27 We then augment model (6) by additionally controlling for these measures of 
industry expertise one at a time. In the untabulated results, we find that all four measures have a 
significant and positive effect on Star_Award for both samples (p-value < 0.1 or better). 
Importantly, the results of Female and its interaction effect with Beauty remain inferentially 
similar to those reported in Table 9.  
5.3 Differential social networking effects for female and male analysts  
  The financial analyst profession is male-dominated in both the United States and China. 
Consistent with this, Fang and Huang (2017) find that male analysts receive higher benefits from 
social capital than female analysts in the U.S. labor market. Therefore, discrimination on gender 
and beauty may impact the All-Star voting outcome through the social network. While it is 
unclear whether the social networking effects for female and male analysts would apply 
differently to the United States versus China, we seek to answer this question empirically.28 
                                                 
27 The Industry_Rec% measure also captures the effect of analysts’ reiterations of stock recommendations, which 
tend to be associated with smaller market reactions and thus may not be fully captured by the CAR measure. 
28 This analysis also helps control for analyst performance. Analysts with better social connections have more 
resources. Therefore they are more likely to arrange client access to corporate managers and are more likely to 
provide better service to clients. In this sense, the social connection between analysts and managers can be viewed 
as a performance measure to proxy for the ability to arrange client access to corporate managers and to provide 
special services, such as corporate site visits. In a China setting, Gu et al. (2019) find that the social connection 
between analysts and the buy side (i.e., fund managers) contributes to analyst ratings and analyst compensation. 
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  Following Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy (2010) and Fang and Huang (2017), we identify 
the U.S. analysts who graduated from the country’s top 100 universities and Canada’s top five 
universities. We then collect the educational information for all executives and directors of 
companies followed by these analysts. We match the schools of the analysts with those of the 
executives and directors. We thus generate a school tie measure, whereby the value of SocialTies 
is one if the analyst attended the same institution with any executive or director of the covered 
firms and zero otherwise. Similarly, we collect the education background of Chinese analysts and 
all of the fund managers investing in the companies followed by these analysts and generate a 
school tie measure, whereby the value of SocialTies is one if the analyst attended the same 
university with any fund manager investing in the covered firms and zero otherwise (Gu, Li, Li, 
and Yang 2019). We then augment model (6) by additionally controlling for SocialTies. In the 
untabulated results, we find a significant and positive effect of SocialTies on Star_Award for both 
samples (p-value < 0.05 or better). The results of Female and its interaction effect with Beauty 
are inferentially similar to those reported in Table 9. 
5.4 Does gender and beauty discrimination vary with the extent of female analyst presence?  
  Panel C of Table 5 reports that the extent of female analyst coverage varies across 
industries. As such, a natural question to ask is whether the gender and beauty discrimination 
toward female analysts is stronger in the more male-concentrated industries. To examine this 
issue, we divide the samples into two subsamples: 1) the top three industries with the highest 
percentage of female analysts and 2) all other industries. We then re-estimate model (6). The 
untabulated results show that, for the U.S. analyst sample, the gender and beauty biases toward 
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females are not statistically significant in the top three industries largely covered by female 
analysts. For the China analyst sample, the gender bias is not statistically significant, and the 
beauty bias is statistically weaker in the top three industries largely covered by female analysts. 
The degree of gender and beauty bias is negatively associated with the percentage of female 
analysts across industries within the United States or China. In other words, these results suggest 
that gender and beauty biases are less (more) pronounced in the less (more) male-dominated 
industries. However, these findings do not explain why gender and beauty discrimination 
function differently in the two countries. 
5.5 Alternative beauty measure for the China analyst sample  
Although previous research shows little cross-cultural variation in people’s perceptions of 
which facial characteristics are considered attractive (e.g., Perrett et al. 1994; Langlois et al., 
2000), we recognize that the ethnicity of MTurk raters does not represent the ethnicity of voters 
for the Chinese All-Star analyst awards. This mismatch could bias our Beauty measure and the 
empirical results. To address this concern, we recalculate the mean-adjusted quantitative beauty 
score for each Chinese analyst based on the ratings received from all Asian MTurk and student 
raters and then re-estimate the regressions. The untabulated results from estimating model (4) 
show a significant and positive coefficient estimate on Beauty (p-value < 0.01). The untabulated 
results from estimating model (6) show a significant and negative coefficient estimate on Female 
(p-value < 0.01) and a significant and positive coefficient estimate on Female×Beauty (p-value < 
0.1). Our main results are thus robust to the modified beauty measure for the China analyst 
sample.  
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5.6 Beauty premium and analyst visibility 
  For the U.S. analyst sample, an alternative explanation for the lack of a beauty premium 
may be due to the visibility of financial analysts.29 If fund managers never meet analysts in 
person or see their pictures, beauty should have little effect on voting outcomes. To test this 
alternative explanation, we investigate whether the beauty premium varies with the physical 
distance between analysts and fund managers or with media coverage of analysts. Specifically, 
regarding physical distance, we assume analysts working in New York City (NYC), where the 
major stock exchanges are located, have more opportunities for face-to-face interaction with 
voters. As for media coverage, we calculate the number of times an analyst appears in major 
news and business sources (MCover), such as press release wires, Reuters newswires, and The 
Wall Street Journal. We then add NYC and MCover and their interactions with Beauty to Models 
(4) and (6) and re-estimate the regression.30 
The untabulated results show that the coefficient estimates on NYC and MCover are 
positive and significant but do not change the significance of Beauty and the interaction term 
Female×Beauty. In addition, the interaction terms Beauty×NYC and Beauty×MCover are 
positive but insignificant. These results suggest that the visibility of analysts affects the 
likelihood of All-Star awards but has little effect on the influence of the beauty premium in All-
Star analyst voting. Taken together, our evidence does not support the conjecture that the 
                                                 
29 Eckel and Petrie (2011) find that people are willing to pay extra to see or have face-to-face interaction with peers, 
suggesting that facial cues have informational value. 
30 The locations of the U.S. analysts are extracted from their LinkedIn pages. 
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visibility of analysts explains the absence of a beauty premium in All-Star analyst voting in the 
United States.     
5.7 Plastic surgery 
In many Asian countries, females believe they have a better chance in recruitment and 
promotion when they have plastic surgery. If this is the case, some Chinese attractive analysts 
may undergo plastic surgery to do better in All-Star competitions, which may, in turn, be 
correlated with family wealth and background. To address this concern, we asked a Korean 
plastic surgery doctor to look at all the pictures of Chinese female analysts and pick the ones 
with a high probability of having undergone plastic surgery. The doctor identified 27 such 
analysts (24% of the Chinese female analyst subsample). The average quantitative raw (mean-
adjusted) beauty scores for these 27 analysts, compared with the rest of the sample, are 65.52 and 
61.83 (16.60 and 11.69), respectively. This difference suggests that plastic surgery improves the 
beauty score. In an untabulated analysis, we exclude these analysts from our sample and rerun all 
analyses. Our results are robust.31  
6. Conclusion  
This paper investigates whether gender discrimination and beauty bias exist and interact 
with each other in All-Star analyst voting. Exploring these two types of discrimination in the 
United States and China, two countries with different cultures and legal environments, may help 
illuminate the roots of these biases. Collectively, we find that female analysts are more (less) 
                                                 
31 In another untabulated analysis, our results hold after excluding female analysts with Beauty in the top decile, 
suggesting that our results are not driven by a few unusual females. 
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likely to be voted as All-Stars in the United States (China). Beauty, on average, does not affect 
the likelihood of being voted as an All-Star analyst in the United States but increases the 
likelihood in China. Attractive female Chinese analysts can overcome gender discrimination and 
have a similar likelihood of being voted as an All-Star, compared with male analysts. Attractive 
female U.S. analysts, however, suffer a beauty penalty.  
Our findings suggest that gender and beauty effects can manifest themselves distinctively 
within different countries. We attribute the forms of discrimination to differences in culture and 
legal environments, acknowledging the possibility that other distinctions between the United 
States and China could be driving our results. In addition, our findings are unique to the financial 
analyst industry. It is unclear whether these findings may generalize to other industries. Future 
research could further explore this issue in different settings.  
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Panel A: U.S. analyst sample 
Sample selection criteria Number of Observations 
Analysts with names in the I/B/E/S recommendation file, 2014   4,377 
Exclude: without LinkedIn profile (1,755) 
Exclude: without quality photos for rating (1,195) 
 1,427 
  
Analyst-years with quality photos and EPS forecasts, 2013–2015 3,695 
Exclude: industries not classified by Institutional Investor  (614) 
Exclude: without actual EPS to calculate EPS forecast errors (13) 
Exclude: without financial statement data to calculate control variables (52) 
Exclude: without any All-Star analyst in an industry-year (307) 
Final sample: number of analyst-years (analysts)                    2,709 (1,121) 
  
Panel B: China analyst sample 
Sample selection criteria Number of Observations 
Candidates for All-Star voting, with names and photos provided by New 
Fortune Magazine 
922 
Exclude: sales managers  (170) 
Exclude: candidates working in the Macroeconomy, Strategy, Financial 




Analyst-years with quality photos and EPS forecasts, 2013–2015 1,274 
Exclude: with group photos (66) 
Exclude: with actual EPS to calculate EPS forecast errors (15) 
Exclude: with financial statement data to calculate control variables (27) 
Exclude: with at least one All-Star analyst in an industry-year (206) 
Final sample: number of analyst-years (analysts)                 960 (442) 
  
This table presents the sample selection criteria. We start with a sample of 1,427 U.S. analysts (585 
Chinese analysts) with quality photos for rating purposes. After merging with I/B/E/S and Compustat 
(CSMAR) databases, we derive the final sample consisting of 2,709 U.S. analyst-years (960 Chinese 
analyst-years) for the years 2013 to 2015.  




Summary Statistics for Key Variables 
 
 
U.S. Analyst Sample 
(N = 2,709) 
China Analyst Sample 
(N = 960) 
Variable Mean Median Stdev Mean Median Stdev 
Star_Award 0.09 0.00 0.28 0.37 0.00 0.48 
Female 0.09 0.00 0.29 0.24 0.00 0.43 
Beauty (Quantitative) 49.05 48.44 10.87 49.61 48.90 12.65 
Beauty (Mean-Adj. Quantitative) -2.35 -1.21 17.91 -2.73 -3.31 15.00 
Age 40.39 40.00 7.46 31.41 30.00 4.54 
CAR -0.00 0.00 0.04 0.02 0.00 0.05 
AFE 28.90 26.25 14.78 34.78 33.31 15.65 
Horizon 75.22 78.34 16.40 57.40 58.46 20.83 
Freq 43.58 44.50 20.32 30.94 29.08 18.70 
BSize 60.92 42.50 56.07 61.27 53.67 27.28 
NFirm 13.39 13.00 7.06 19.82 18.00 11.91 
NInd 4.21 4.00 2.46 5.28 5.00 2.83 
GExp 8.49 7.50 6.68 2.23 2.00 1.94 
FExp 4.18 3.62 2.44 1.51 1.30 0.67 
Size 8.91 8.97 1.44 16.49 16.43 0.66 
MTB 5.76 3.91 7.17 2.09 1.86 1.06 
ROA 0.00 0.03 0.12 0.06 0.06 0.03 
 
This table presents descriptive statistics for the sample used in the empirical tests. Star_Award = All-Star 
analyst, an indicator variable set to one if the U.S. (Chinese) analyst is a star analyst in year t and zero 
otherwise. Female = an indicator variable set to one if the analyst is female and zero otherwise. Beauty = 
Facial attractiveness of the analyst, measured in raw quantitative and mean-adjusted quantitative terms. 
Age = Age of the analyst. CAR = the average three-day abnormal cumulative stock returns surrounding 
the analyst’s stock recommendations for the firms covered in year t. AFE = Earnings forecast error, 
calculated as the mean of the analyst’s relative forecast errors for the firms followed in year t, where 
relative forecast error is the analyst’s most recent forecast error (i.e., |analyst earnings forecast − actual 
earnings|), relative to the most recent forecast errors of all analysts following the firm in year t and ranges 
from 0 to 100 (Clement and Tse 2003). Horizon = Earnings forecast horizon, calculated as the mean of the 
analyst’s relative forecast horizon for the firms followed in year t, where relative forecast horizon is the 
analyst’s forecast horizon (i.e., the number of days between the analyst’s earnings forecast and the firm’s 
actual earnings announcement), relative to the forecast horizons of all analysts following the firm in year t 
and ranges from 0 to 100. Freq = Earnings forecast frequency, calculated as the mean of the analyst’s 
relative forecast frequency for the firms followed in year t, where relative forecast frequency is the 
analyst’s forecast frequency, relative to the forecast frequencies of all analysts following the firm in year t 
and ranges from 0 to 100. BSize = Brokerage firm size, calculated as the number of analysts employed by 
the sell-side firm in year t. NFirm = Number of firms followed by the analyst in year t. NInd = Number of 
industries followed by the analyst in year t. GExp = General experience, defined as the number of years 
between an analyst’s first appearance in the I/B/E/S or CSMAR database and the end of year t. FExp = 
Firm-specific experience, defined as the average number of years that the analyst has followed the firms 
in his or her research portfolio in year t. Size = Average firm size, measured as the mean of the natural 
logarithm of the market value of the firms followed by the analyst in year t. MTB = Average market-to-
book ratio of the firms followed by the analyst in year t. ROA = Average return on assets of the firms 
followed by the analyst in year t.  




Analyst Gender and Performance 
 
 U.S. Analyst Sample China Analyst Sample 
 (1) (2) 
 AFE AFE 
Female 0.032 -2.156** 
 
(0.04) (-2.07) 
Age -0.036 0.136 
 (-0.69) (1.53) 
Horizon 0.393*** 0.476*** 
 (17.51) (14.29) 
Freq -0.021 0.067** 
 (-0.87) (2.49) 
BSize 0.008 -0.014 
 
(1.11) (-0.58) 
NFirm -0.232*** -0.116 
 (-3.81) (-1.59) 
NInd  0.561*** 0.525* 
 (3.78) (1.84) 
GExp -0.029 -0.275 
 (-0.46) (-0.60) 
FExp 0.157 0.479 
 (0.91) (0.36) 
Size -1.826*** -2.034* 
 (-3.62) (-1.79) 
MTB -0.024 -1.285 
 (-0.59) (-0.96) 
ROA 4.380 -67.710* 
 (0.94) (-1.87) 
Industry-Year Fixed Effects Included Included 
N 2,709 960 
Adj. R-squared 0.397 0.432 
 
This table presents the results from estimating the OLS regression of model (1). See Table 2 
for the definition of all variables. t-statistics (in parentheses) are calculated based on 
standard errors clustered by broker and by year. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels 








Test of H1: Does Gender Discrimination Exist in the Star Analyst Voting? 
 
 U.S. Analyst Sample China Analyst Sample 
 (1) (2) 
 Star_Award Star_Award 
Female 0.301* -0.093*** 
 
(1.77) (-3.42) 
Age 0.025* 0.003 
 (1.89) (0.32) 
CAR 2.119*** -0.136 
 (5.08) (-0.13) 
AFE -0.019*** 0.007 
 (-2.61) (0.82) 
Horizon 0.013** 0.002 
 (2.13) (0.18) 
Freq 0.004 0.016*** 
 (1.15) (4.33) 
BSize 0.008*** 0.011*** 
 
(7.61) (4.99) 
NFirm 0.085*** 0.047*** 
 (3.84) (4.14) 
NInd  -0.103** -0.121* 
 (-2.06) (-1.86) 
GExp -0.026 -0.039 
 (-1.01) (-0.51) 
FExp 0.125*** -0.089 
 (4.33) (-0.42) 
Size 0.485*** 0.453** 
 (6.60) (2.19) 
MTB 0.002 0.068 
 (0.35) (0.49) 
ROA 1.577* -3.648 
 (1.82) (-0.43) 
Industry-Year Fixed Effects Included Included 
N 2,709 960 
Pseudo R-squared 0.393 0.220 
 
This table presents the results from estimating the probit regression of model (2). See Table 
2 for variable definitions. z-statistics (in parentheses) are calculated based on standard 
errors clustered by broker and by year. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is 
indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
  




Summary Statistics for Beauty Measures and Female Analyst Coverage  
 
Panel A reports the summary statistics of the raw quantitative beauty scores based on both MTurk and 
student ratings. It also reports the summary statistics by different ethnicity groups of raters. Panel B 
reports the summary statistics of the raw quantitative beauty measures, age, and general experience by 
analyst groupings. The significance of the mean difference at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is indicated by 
*, **, and ***, respectively. Panel C reports the top three industries by the percentage of female analysts.  
 
Panel A: beauty scores by ethnicity groups of raters 
 
Panel B: average beauty score, age and general experience by analyst groupings 
 U.S. Analyst Sample China Analyst Sample 
 
Beauty Age GExp Beauty Age GExp 
By gender:       
   Male analysts 47.94 41 9 45.53 32 2 
   Female analysts 59.93 38 7 62.33 31 2 
   Difference: male – female -11.99***   -16.80***   
       
By award status:       
   Star Analysts 49.56 43 12 50.60 31 2 
   Non-Star Analysts 49.00 40 8 49.02 31 2 
   Difference: Star – nonStar 0.56   1.58*   
 
Panel C: top three industry sectors covered by female analysts  
U.S. Analyst Sample China Analyst Sample 
Industry Sector Female% Industry Sector Female% 
1. Food, Beverage, Household, 
Personal Care Products 
 
2. Retailing/Department Stores, 
Specialty Softlines 
 









1. Textiles Garment and Apparel 
 
  
2. Services (Hotel, Restaurants and 
Leisure) 
  








 U.S. Analyst Sample China Analyst Sample 
 Mean Median Stdev Mean Median Stdev 
MTurk ratings        
   All raters 49.56 50.00 20.98 50.17 50.00 21.27 
By ethnicity:       
   Non-Asian raters 48.03 50.00 20.60 50.49 50.00 21.09 
   Asian raters 55.80 57.00 21.37 47.82 50.00 22.38 
       
Student ratings       
   All raters 43.55 45.00 21.38 41.46 43.00 22.64 
By ethnicity:       
   Non-Asian raters 44.35 46.00 21.57 40.84 41.00 22.78 
   Asian raters 42.05 44.00 20.93 42.60 45.00 22.36 




Analyst Beauty and Performance 
 
 U.S. Analyst Sample China Analyst Sample 
 (1) (2) 
 AFE AFE 
Beauty -0.022 -0.028 
 
(-1.31) (-1.13) 
Age -0.050 0.125 
 (-0.92) (1.38) 
Horizon 0.394*** 0.479*** 
 (17.60) (14.31) 
Freq -0.019 0.068** 
 (-0.78) (2.52) 
BSize 0.008 -0.014 
 
(1.13) (-0.55) 
NFirm -0.233*** -0.112 
 (-3.82) (-1.52) 
NInd  0.557*** 0.554** 
 (3.74) (2.01) 
GExp -0.028 -0.264 
 (-0.45) (-0.57) 
FExp 0.157 0.247 
 (0.90) (0.19) 
Size -1.820*** -1.938* 
 (-3.65) (-1.66) 
MTB -0.024 -1.297 
 (-0.59) (-0.95) 
ROA 4.423 -73.521** 
 (0.94) (-2.10) 
Industry-Year Fixed Effects Included Included 
N 2,709 960 
Adj. R-squared 0.397 0.430 
 
This table presents the results from estimating the OLS regression of model (3). See Table 2 
for variable definitions. t-statistics (in parentheses) are calculated based on standard errors 
clustered by broker and by year. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is indicated by 









Test of H2: Does Beauty Discrimination Exist in the Star Analyst Voting? 
 
 U.S. Analyst Sample China Analyst Sample 
 (1) (2) 
 Star_Award Star_Award 
Beauty -0.001 0.006*** 
 
(-0.24) (2.59) 
Age 0.022* 0.010 
 (1.70) (0.87) 
CAR 2.074*** -0.056 
 (3.44) (-0.05) 
AFE -0.019*** 0.007 
 (-2.63) (0.83) 
Horizon 0.013** 0.002 
 (2.06) (0.17) 
Freq 0.005 0.016*** 
 (1.36) (4.36) 
BSize 0.008*** 0.011*** 
 
(7.84) (4.85) 
NFirm 0.084*** 0.046*** 
 (3.78) (4.23) 
NInd  -0.105** -0.118* 
 (-2.12) (-1.80) 
GExp -0.024 -0.034 
 (-0.91) (-0.44) 
FExp 0.123*** -0.096 
 (3.99) (-0.45) 
Size 0.486*** 0.450** 
 (6.55) (2.10) 
MTB 0.003 0.076 
 (0.55) (0.54) 
ROA 1.553* -4.413 
 (1.71) (-0.54) 
Industry-Year Fixed Effects Included Included 
N 2,709 960 
Pseudo R-squared 0.391 0.222 
 
This table presents the results from estimating the probit regression of model (4). See Table 
2 for variable definitions. z-statistics (in parentheses) are calculated based on standard 
errors clustered by broker and by year. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is 








The Interaction Effect of Analyst Gender and Beauty on Performance 
 
 U.S. Analyst Sample China Analyst Sample 
 (1) (2) 
 AFE AFE 
Female 0.248 -2.469* 
 
(0.23) (-1.92) 
Female × Beauty -0.017 0.023 
 (-0.34) (0.58) 
Male × Beauty -0.024 0.002 
 (-1.41) (0.05) 
Age -0.050 0.141 
 (-0.91) (1.59) 
Horizon 0.394*** 0.475*** 
 (17.63) (13.94) 
Freq -0.019 0.067** 
 (-0.79) (2.43) 
BSize 0.008 -0.015 
 
(1.09) (-0.59) 
NFirm -0.232*** -0.116 
 (-3.80) (-1.58) 
NInd  0.557*** 0.523* 
 (3.72) (1.83) 
GExp -0.028 -0.275 
 (-0.45) (-0.60) 
FExp 0.156 0.538 
 (0.89) (0.41) 
Size -1.817*** -2.044* 
 (-3.62) (-1.82) 
MTB -0.024 -1.271 
 (-0.60) (-0.94) 
ROA 4.384 -67.570* 
 (0.93) (-1.86) 
Industry-Year Fixed Effects Included Included 
N 2,709 960 
Adj. R-squared 0.397 0.431 
 
This table presents the results from estimating the OLS regression of model (5). See Table 2 
for variable definitions. t-statistics (in parentheses) are calculated based on standard errors 
clustered by broker and by year. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is indicated by 
*, **, and ***, respectively. 
  




Test of H3: Does Beauty Affect Gender Discrimination in the Star Analyst Voting? 
 
 U.S. Analyst Sample China Analyst Sample 
 (1) (2) 
 Star_Award Star_Award 
Female 0.418** -0.384*** 
 
(2.37) (-3.87) 
Female × Beauty -0.014*** 0.017*** 
 (-2.62) (3.10) 
Male × Beauty 0.000 0.009 
 (0.07) (1.63) 
Age 0.024* 0.012 
 (1.93) (1.04) 
CAR 2.202*** -0.151 
 (5.89) (-0.15) 
AFE -0.018*** 0.007 
 (-2.62) (0.73) 
Horizon 0.013** 0.002 
 (2.15) (0.18) 
Freq 0.005 0.016*** 
 (1.35) (4.08) 
BSize 0.008*** 0.011*** 
 
(7.98) (4.67) 
NFirm 0.086*** 0.046*** 
 (3.84) (4.04) 
NInd  -0.102** -0.123* 
 (-2.06) (-1.90) 
GExp -0.028 -0.036 
 (-1.11) (-0.47) 
FExp 0.127*** -0.064 
 (4.53) (-0.30) 
Size 0.495*** 0.433** 
 (6.57) (2.06) 
MTB 0.003 0.084 
 (0.61) (0.63) 
ROA 1.597* -3.802 
 (1.81) (-0.45) 
Industry-Year Fixed Effects Included Included 
N 2,709 960 
Pseudo R-squared 0.395 0.226 
 
This table presents the results from estimating the probit regression of model (6). See Table 
2 for variable definitions. z-statistics (in parentheses) are calculated based on standard 
errors clustered by broker and by year. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is 
indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
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